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ABSTRACT 
 
In the period between 1835 and 1931 the Rothschild House established one of the most 
complex and influential business networks in Spanish economic history. This network 
controlled a wide range of activities, including financial services for the Spanish 
Government and the Bank of Spain, as well as the management of industrial, mining 
and railway firms. Instances of these firms are Rio Tinto Co., Société Minière et 
Metallurgique Peñarroya, MZA railway company and Deutsch & Cie, which was the 
main oil refining firm in Spain at the end of the 19th century. 
 
The present article intends to describe and analyse the internal structure of the 
Rothschild network, its organisation and the way in which it avoided agency problems. 
Likewise, it aims at study depth the devices used by the network to obtain the requisite 
information for the improvement of investment, and management decision-making. The 
analysis focuses on the nature of the Rothschild’s business network, by applying the 
theory of entrepreneurial functions, and illustrating rent-seeking strategies in the context 
of an extremely politically-biased market, as was the case of the Spanish market 
between 1835 and 1931. 
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The present article is part of a research project of a wider scope, aiming to 
reflect on the nature of the businesses of the Rothschild House in Spain. We believe the 
case to be of the highest importance, as it takes place both in the field of public finance 
and in industrial companies, developing within a chronological framework that 
embraces most of contemporary history. However, the question at stake is not so much 
analysing the influence that the House actually had in the economic development of the 
country, but considering the different entrepreneurial functions or rent-seeking 
enterprises carried out on their initiative, as well as the effectiveness of their business 
structure in the generation of a large-scale investment process.  
Overall, we can state that the business chronology of the Rothschild House in 
Spain harks back to the funding of the Wellington army during the Independence war, 
though their presence in Spain would not be definitively established until 1835. It was 
in that very year that this prestigious banking family was able to conclude a long history 
of discrepancies with Ferdinand VII and the liberal governments, signing the agreement 
on the marketing of mercury in the Almadén mines, which, together with the Idria 
mines, allowed them to exercise an effective monopoly of the world supply of mercury 
for more than ninety years
1. From that time on, the bankers established a branch in 
Madrid, under the management of Daniel Weisweiller, who managed to control a major 
part of the business involved in the funding of the civil war (first Carlista war, 1833-
1840), in partnerships with the key representatives of the financial elite in the capital 
city
2. 
After several years of a certain cooling-off in the financial operations with the 
State after 1848, at the end of 1855 the Rothschild managed to get into the business of 
railway marketing through the Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante (MZA). This company would 
develop a huge investing effort allowing them to build 35% of the main Spanish railway 
lines, under a fierce competition from the Compañía del Norte, of a similar size, run by 
the Pereire family. During the intervening time between these operations, the Rothschild 
House strongly moved their financial transactions ahead with the bank of Spain and the 
Spanish Public Treasury, with which it cooperated in a substantial part of the debt 
issuing operations that took place in the 1860s and the Sexenio period
3.  
From 1875 to1880, without abandoning their financial relationships with the 
Spanish government, with whom they collaborated in the debt settlements of 1876 and  
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1881
4 the group dramatically turned around their transactions in Spain. They attempted 
to take advantage of their experience in the trading of raw materials to go on to directly 
run the manufacturing companies, either buying off their shares or promoting specific 
businesses. From that moment on, the Rothschild family favoured a new strategy that 
would lead them to concentrate their investments in the field of the mining companies 
of copper and lead, over which the Rothschild line had developed momentous 
exchanges from the middle of the 19
th century, as well as oil, due to their growing 
interests in the founding of the oil refinery Deutsch et Cie, born in 1879 from an 
agreement with the French refining company Deutsch de la Meurthe, the Peñarroya 
Mining and Metallurgic Company, set up in 1881, and finally, the purchasing of a stake 
in the Rio Tinto Company in 1888. The latter were undisputed leaders in Europe and 
Spain in the production and elaboration of lead and copper pyrite, respectively
5.  
The development of each and every one of these businesses, which turned the 
Rothschild House into the biggest investor in Spanish economic history
6, calls for a 
complex and exhaustive explanation, which is not within the scope of the present work. 
However, we do aim to describe and analyze the would-be importance of these 
enterprises in the business network structure of the family. Consequently, our goal is to 
study the way in which it was hierarchically structured, how agency cost were avoided 
and which tools could be used in the investment decision process.  
There exists a wide range of literature on the figure and role of the entrepreneur 
in economic development
7, as well as relevant contributions to network theory, 
emphasising the consequential role of the circulation of information when reducing 
transaction costs in the different business scopes
8. Of special prominence are the 
innovations made in the study of cultural and ethnical factors in network development
9, 
especially plentiful in the case of Jewish business networks. Andrew Godley and 
Doreen Arnoldus’s
10  work has proved these networks to be more effective than other 
competitors’ ones, therefore constituting a useful point of reference for our study.  
As far as their investments in Spain are concerned, it is also imperative to 
remark on the fact that the business network of the Rothschild family operated in the 
context of an incredibly unstable and politically-biased market, in which the 
Government intervened time and time again, often making very discretionary strategic 
decisions
11. In normal conditions the risk rate for financial operations and investments 
had to extremely high. However, the Rothschild family, either directly or through their  
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Madrid branch, knew perfectly how to take advantage of the facilities offered to them 
by the fragile Spanish political milieu in order to reduce uncertainty. They 
accomplished this feat either through their accurate knowledge of the market conditions, 
provided by their excellent network of agents, correspondents and associates, or through 
the integration of the Spanish political class around themselves. The latter would have 
meant, eventually, a high-scale cacicato
12 of sorts around their companies and financial 
businesses, which permitted them the recurrent usage of insider information, reducing 
their risk rate to zero and obtaining substantial extra revenues. 
At this point, the questions raised are manifold, and we should establish some 
necessary hypotheses. It seems obvious that the Spanish economy could be described as 
one of “politically-biased” markets, in Lindblom’s sense
13, namely an economy of high 
regulation and interventionism on the part of the State. In this scenario, the 
accomplishment of the different vectors of the entrepreneurial roles becomes especially 
complex. Taking into account that the entrepreneurial activity may consist of the 
following: reducing the ever-existing corporate inefficiencies (Leibenstein
14); gathering 
the profit opportunities that may be accurately perceived in markets (Kirzner
15); facing 
uncertainty (Knight
16); and/or innovating (Schumpeter
17). Kirzner and Knight’s 
functions reach a very peculiar profile in politically-based markets and often are more 
similar to rent-seeking than to the proper nature of the entrepreneurial function, which, 
according to Baumol
18, is always closer to productive activities. The chance to exploit 
profits that always exists in the market, to affront uncertainty in order to calculate risk 
and even innovating in the wide typology described by Schumpeter, all of which can be 
attained with a previous, precise and exclusive information on markets by strongly 
interventionist governments. The guarantee to earn profits can be certain when the issue 
is not to perceive what the State is going to become, but whether it is possible to have 
an effect on what has to be done. Therefore, the question is whether this peculiar feature 
of the Spanish economic environment actually had a bearing on the complex 
organizational network that the Rothschild family created. Nevertheless this raises a 
further question: given the absolutely strategic value of information for the Rothschild 
house, was the design of the organizational structural network the most adequate 
bearing of mind the diversity and number of the people involved and the possible 
agency problems that could be arise?  
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A brief description of the configuration of this particular system may help to 
approach these questions. Therefore, the first part of the present article will dwell upon 
the network organization and its incentives, as analysed in their three hierarchical 
levels: parent companies and their branches; correspondents and partners; and the 
clientele.  
  Next,  we will add an analysis of the effectiveness of the  network, focusing on 
the way in which information was circulated and distributed, as well as describing the 
development of the decision-making process; finally, the strategies followed by this 
network so as to reduce costs and risks will precede the conclusions of our work. 
 
II 
 
  The Rothschild house was, and still is, a strictly family enterprise that, initially, 
boasted five different branches spread over Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna and 
Naples during the Napoleonic wars. The one in Frankfurt, where the family came from 
originally, was the meeting place for the first generation, but its importance remained 
largely symbolic; the short-lived headquarters in Naples were the last but one in 
importance, whereas in Vienna Salomon Rothschild managed to get hold of most of the 
public finances of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, generating an important entity such 
as Creditanstalt. Nevertheless, the most outstanding ones were the main offices in 
London, where Nathan Mayer and his heirs created N.M. Rothschild & Sons, one of the 
most prestigious banking houses in the City, as well as the one in Paris, that James 
Rothschild turned into the most important private banking house in Europe until his 
death, that took place in 1868. 
This spreading of headquarters and corporate addresses did not mean a 
severance between the different members of the family, and, in fact, most of the success 
of the famous banking house during most part of the 19
th century was due, precisely, to 
their sense of coordination and solidarity in business; mutual commitments were 
institutionalised periodically through internal pacts that worked from 1814 until at least 
1905
19.For our purposes, the London and Paris headquarters explicitly shared most of 
our businesses in Spain, to the point of sharing agents, financing and the accountancy of 
the operations.  
Figure One: The Madrid Agency in the Rothschild business in the 19
th century  
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LONDON
N.M. ROTHSCHILD & SONS
(1798-today)
VIENNA
S.M. Von Rothschild
(1802-1941)
NAPLES
Carl M. Von Rothschild
(1814-1848)
FRANCFORT
M.A. Von Rothschild & Shone
(1805-1902)
PARIS
ROTHSCHILD FRÈRES
(1812-1980)
ROTHSCHILD GROUP
MADRID
(D. Weisweiller, 18355-1855
Weisweiller & Bauer, 1855-1892
I. Bauer, 1892-1894
Bauer &Cia, 1898-1908
Gustavo Bauer, 1908-1917
Bauer & Cia, 1917-1930
LA HAVANNA
(K. Scharfernbert, 1856-1878)
NEW YORK
(A. Belmont, 1837-1936)
SAN FRANCISCO 
(CALIFORNIA-MÉXICO)
(B. Davison, 1847-1877?
Gansl, Albert & Cullen, 
Jeffrey, 1878-1880) TRIESTE
(Morpurgo & Parente, 1837-1891)
ANTWERP &
BRUXELLS
(Richtenberger, L., 1827; 
1835-1841 
S. Lambert, 1853-1930)
EL HAVRE
1848-1900
AMSTERDAM
Goldschmidt, D. L., 1871-1926?
PATNERS & CORRESPONDENTS
SUBSIDIARIES IN THE GROUP
CLIENTELE
 
Source: own elaboration from the Paris and London Rothschild Archives. 
Rothschild had scarcely 50 employees in each of the main offices in Paris and 
London in the middle of the 19
th century, but they possessed a wide network of agents 
and correspondents all over Europe and America, which, despite its limitations, was 
able to last with a level of efficiency higher than that of other contemporary limited 
liability entities, with a high rate of involvement in both the international financial and 
commodity markets.  
The Rothschild agencies either emerged successively in line with specific 
businesses or because the House attempted to expand in certain markets. The oldest, 
such as those of Trieste, Ambers, New York or The Havre emerged as a complement to 
the network itself, with the aim to connect their five holding companies to other 
locations so as to promote the clearing of bills, the arbitration of gold, silver and 
currencies, as well as the management of determined transactions and businesses 
without the aid of external middlemen. The San Francisco one, however, was born out 
of the need to have an intermediary in the massive purchases of Californian gold and as 
a fixed distributor of mercury amongst the producers of silver in Mexico and Havana, 
where Karl Scharfenberg was sent with the mission of accelerating the payment of 
drafts or bills on the properties in Cuba. Such transactions subsidized a considerable  
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amount of the expense of the first Carlista war. This funding was directly sent to the 
Headquarters in London and their New York agent, August Belmont. 
The Madrid main office was set up when Lionel Rothschild delegated all the 
affairs in Spain to Daniel Weisweiller, an agent who had travelled with him to this 
country in 1835. This agent was given a universal power of attorney to act and carry out 
any transaction on behalf of the Rothschild House
20. Weisweiller would work on his 
own for twenty years, with the exception of some months in 1838 when he was assisted 
by Scharfenberg before moving to Cuba, in the face of the spectacular rate that the 
transactions acquired in the island
21.  
At the end of the 40s, Weisweiller was absolutely overloaded with work,   
burdened with physical ailments and suffering the deep loss of his closest employees, 
Barcaiztegui and Estanislao Urquijo. Consequently, the Rothschild sent Ignacio Bauer, 
one of the most brilliant employees in the House, to his aid. Bauer had Hungarian 
origins but was reared amongst the Trieste Morpburgs, and was also the nephew of 
Moritz Goldschmidt, the head of Salomon’s employees in Vienna
22. Wilhem Ettling 
was also sent, although we are uncertain about his date of incorporation in 1850. The 
position of each of these employees would not be the same in Madrid, however, as 
Bauer would go to Spain as a high echelon of the House, and second in command, soon 
getting the same rank as Weisweiller. Ettling occupied a secondary role, even if he was 
granted power of representation on several occasions.  
Weisweiller and Bauer decided to institutionalize their peer relationship on 
January 1
st, 1855, creating their new company, Weisweiller & Bauer Cía. That very day 
the association between Scharfenberg and Tolmé & Cía was incorporated to form 
Scharfenberg Tolmé & Cía
23, which henceforth would work as link of the Rothschild 
House in Havana, as was customary since 1838.  
At an internal level, the whole of the Rothschild’s business network was 
organized in an extremely closed fashion, being promoted by the development of a 
dramatic family endogamy, and avoiding the presence of external specialists and 
managers. This proved to be, in the long term, the most effective system to prevent 
agency problems from happening, as well as the apparition of asymmetrical information 
from taking place.  
The reason lies in the fact that in the network of relationships and fidelities at the 
Rothschild agencies was settled in a strict, complex normative structure of established  
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hierarchical rules overcoming the field of purely economic inconveniences. At the 
agencies, employees were not only Jewish, but were also linked by very closely-knit 
family circles promoted by the sharpest of family endogamies. Agents, additionally, 
were educated from boyhood at the different agencies, among which they used to 
itinerate, in a continuous training process during which they narrowed their family 
relationships. In a certain sense, and despite the existing hierarchies, the key was to be 
found in the fact that their members participated in the business and felt it as something 
of their own, hence seriously reducing possible transaction costs.  
A brief overview of the genealogical tree on Figure 2 shows us the family 
groups that took the role of agents in the Rothschild House in its two main head offices 
in the South of Europe, Madrid and Trieste. The members of the Rothschild House are 
outlined in bold and the full-right members of the Madrid Agency (Daniel Weisweiller, 
Ignacio Bauer, his son Gustavo, his grandchildren Alfredo e Ignacio, Mauricio Schey 
and Alfredo Weil) are marked in larger typeface, as well as other members of the 
agency who did not reach such category, such as Wilhem Ettling, who would have 
become a fully-fledged member but for his precarious health, and Fritz Perugia, who 
spent part of his training process in Madrid before going back to Trieste and taking 
charge of the Rothschild Agency there.  
It is worth remarking on the way in which a continuous blood criss-crossing 
takes place between the Madrid members and the members of the Landauer, 
Morpburgo-Parente and Perugia families
24, as well as with the well-known dynasties of 
bankers like Goldsmith, Shey, Ephrussi, Cahen d’Anvers or the Rothschild family itself. 
It is very revealing the fact that almost all the family branches hark back to the 
Frankfurt Ghetto, from which a high majority of the most relevant members of the 
European finances sprang.  
Figure two: Family links between Rothschild agencies in South Europe.   
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Rosalie 
Bauer
1796-1864
Louisa Landauer
1819-1853
Fanny 
Landauer
1789-1858
Moriz Bauer
1788-1833
Pauline 
Bauer
1821-1903
Ignacio  Ignacio Salom Salomó ón n Bauer Bauer
1827 1827- -1895 1895
Vinzenze
Landauer
1824-1856
Salomon 
Morpurgo
1800-1849
Joseph Baron Morpurgo
1805-
Lisa 
Perugia
Aquille
Perugia
-1865
Lisa 
Parente
Ida Morpurgo
1844-
Emilio 
Morpurgo
Gustavo  Gustavo Bauer Bauer
1865 1865- -1916 1916
María de la 
Concepción Bauer
(1869-?)
Manuel 
Bauer
1872-1895
Rosa Landauer
Eduardo Bauer
(?-1939)
Ignacio  Ignacio Bauer Bauer
(1891 (1891- -1961) 1961)
Alfredo  Alfredo Bauer Bauer
(1893 (1893- -1956) 1956)
Nina Landauer
1825-1892
Gisela von Ephrussi
Ignaz Leopold 
Weil
1800-1873
Henrietta Landauer
1858-
Maurice Weil
Alfred J.  Alfred J. Weil Weil
1849 1849- -1888 1888
Other 3 children
Maria Perugia
1862-1937
Fritz  Fritz Perugia Perugia
1857 1857- -1908 1908
Henrietta Perugia
1855-
Leopold  Leopold Rothschild Rothschild
1847 1847- -1917 1917
2
¿
1
Jules 
Morpurgo
Pauline 
Morpurgo
1848-
Giacchino Morpurgo
Mariano Ruiz 
de Arana
Concepción
García Rendueles
Olga de Gunzburg
María López Chicheri
Fernando Bauer
1873-1943
Daniel  Daniel Weisweiller Weisweiller
1814 1814- -1892 1892
Adeline 
Helbert
-1892
Adela Weisweiller
1845-1925 Guillermo  Guillermo Ettling Ettling
- -1882 1882
Rudolfine
Weisweiller
Mathilde Betty Weisweiller 
(1855-1897)
David 
Weisweiller
Lydia Levy Barent Cohen
Other
6c h i l d r e Hannah Cohen
1783-1850
Nathan Mayer  Nathan Mayer 
Rothschild Rothschild
1777 1777- -1836 1836
Adeline Cohen
1799-1877
John Helbert
1785-1861
Thedore Porges (1843-1907)
Josef 
Landauer
1793-1855
Other 
10 children
Virginia Morpurgo Louisa 
Morpurgo
Emile 
Landauer
Irene Landauer
-1936
Louis Cahen d’Anvers
Paul Schey
1854-
Evelina
Landauer
1859-1930
Other 2 
children Philipp Schey
1881-1957?
Emy Schey
1879-
Victor von Ephrussi
Moriz Moriz Schey Schey
Hermione 
Landauer
1822-1904
Freidrich
Schey
EdouardLandauer
1831-1888
Other 
5 children
Elio
Morpurgo
1803-
Salomon 
Bauer
David  Weisweiller
1774-1818
Güttle
Goldschmidt
Leopold Weisweiller
-1871
10 children
Nannette Landauer
1803-1891
Moses Goldschmidt
1803-1891
Alexander Goldschmidt
1840-
Auguste Leopoldine
Weisweiller ¿
¿
¿
Cecile
Bauer
Other 3 children
Lili von Goldsmih-Rothschild Alix Schey
1911-1982 Guy de  Guy de Rothschild Rothschild
1909 1909- -
David de  David de Rothschild  Rothschild 1942 1942- -
Goldsmih family
Adolf
Landauer
1829-1855
Ellen H. 
Worms
1836-
¿¿
Isaac Gabriel 
Landauer
1760-1826
Julie 
Hamel-Goldscmidt
1769-1841
2 children
3 children
Other 3
children
Other 3
children
Other 2
girls
Other 5
children
= marriages
 
Source: own elaboration from the Paris and London Rothschild Archives. 
 
Across three generations, the Bauer family married into the Landauer family 
(Ignacio’s father and aunt, respectively), the Morpurgo (Ignacio himself
25) and again the 
Landauer (his son Gustavo). Alfred Weil, who was a full-fledged agent for the Madrid 
Agency from 1877
26, was a nephew of Ignacio’s, and worked at the agency since his 
early youth, until his premature death in 1888. The marriage between the daughter of  
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the Baron of Morpurgo and Louis Cahen d’Anvers turned Bauer into the brother-in-law 
of the would-be President of Peñarroya
27. 
Weisweiller, on the other hand, was married to a Helbert Cohen female member, 
which turned him into a nephew once-removed of Nathan Mayer Rothschild’s. He had 
also connections, on his mother’s part, with the Goldsmith family, closely-knit to the 
German and Austrian branches of the Rothschild. One of the deepest disappointments in 
the banker’s life might have been the lack of male progeny, which constituted a major 
element in the transmission of business in Jewish families
28.  However, he married his 
daughter Mathilde to the diamond tycoon Theodores Porges, also a partner of the 
Ephrussi-Porges family
29, although he regarded with distaste the marriage of his 
daughter Adela to Wilhem Ettling.  
It is also worthwhile remarking upon the fact that the Rothschild and their 
partners did not accept, by any means, the people of either their family or training circle 
becoming a part of the rank of agents or associates of the House. A very significant 
example of this attitude came to light in 1874, when Scharfemberg died, and the agency 
in Havana became vacant. At that very time, Bauer wrote to the Rothschild, regarding 
such a vacancy: “Messieurs Burruty and Chaffraix & Co in Havana have sent a 
memorandum, as the successors of Scharfemberg Hohly & Cía; Could you tell us 
whether you wish the new house to remain as a correspondent? (Because) we very well 
know that we will not have them as agents at all”. It is easy to infer from the message 
that the Rothschild drew a very clear-cut difference between associate agents and single 
correspondents.  
It could be interpreted that, from a certain point of view, this organizational 
system is too conservative, being also linked to too many non-economic variables. But 
the significant fact remains that the system worked efficiently and there are no 
identified cases of asymmetrical information among the Rothschild and their 
correspondents.  Such a fact has been repeatedly claimed by experts to be one of the 
main reasons explaining the Rothschild family’s business success and their undisputed 
leadership in the European finances of the last century.  
Obviously, this system of group endogamy was not exclusive to the Jewish 
business houses and banking, as it was widely spread in other ethnic groups in the world 
of finance. This was especially true of the protestant bankers in the German world. But, 
as an internal organization, the Rothschild network managed to acquire a high level of  
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width and efficiency in information flows and business management, and was second to 
none as regards other models of the time. 
 
III 
 
In tune with the agency structure, the Rothschild House leant on other people 
and institutions to carry out certain activities, or to be associates in several determined 
businesses. Literature brands them roughly as “correspondents”, although there were 
several levels of relationship amongst them, depending on different factors that we aim 
to clarify. 
  Correspondents fulfilled a major task in the network, as they constituted the link 
of the House to the economy of several parts of the world (countries, regions, specific 
cities). Paying tribute to their name, apart from drawing bills in their letters, 
correspondents usually informed accurately on the changes taking place in the market 
place, as well as on the situation of the commodity and stock markets in the area. 
Additionally, these messages were the steady source of proposals to get into determined 
projects, offered to the Rothschild directly, or through the Agency, mainly with a view 
to finance different projects or to take part in them. The goals were, subsequently, to set 
up a relationship as smooth as possible with them, as well as ensuring a fidelity that was 
to be compensated, both if the liaison was among equals or whether it implied a certain 
level of subordination.  
In the case of Spain, the most important correspondent for the Rothschild was 
the Bank of San Fernando (later of Spain). Ostensibly, the financiers reached an 
agreement with the management of the bank in 1835 by virtue of which both institutions 
would draw bills between them with a 0.5% charge, plus brokerage and the usual post 
expenses, granting a mutual 4% in the accounts to be opened
30. This wholly 
instrumental liaison only allowed for the establishment of preference financial 
relationships, but constituted, however, the foundation that made a fruitful association 
possible during the following decades. The interest was mutual because, on the one 
hand, the Bank found in the Rothschild a major link with the international financial 
markets, as well as a privileged spokesman in the course of some of the most important 
transactions instructed by the Government, as for instance with the overseas debt 
arrangements in 1876, 1881; the House was also their main supplier of gold and silver,  
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and their best support in times of crisis, namely during the warranty transactions in the 
clearing terms of the General Deposit Savings Bank in 1861, in which the Bank of 
Spain always received advantageous terms as regards the market price of money. As far 
as they were concerned, the Rothschild found in the issuing Bank a client, as well as an 
exceptional partner in their transactions with the Spanish Public Treasury. The House 
had also an important ally in the Bank of Spain, as they faced the intrusion in Spain of 
other international finance groups, like the Pereire or the Paribas, who found strong 
reluctance on the part of the Bank and their area of influence to start operating in 
Spain
31. 
Similar relationships, but of very different hues, were established with other 
private houses of trade and banking, who saw in the Rothschild a support for their 
private businesses, and who compensated them sufficiently for their unconditional 
support as middlemen in the relationships with the Spanish government. The first of 
these houses was that of the merchant-banker Vicente Bertrán de Lis, who acted as the 
first correspondent of the Rothschild’s in Spain in the 20s of the 19
th century. The 
relationship of the Rothschild with the Royal House Manager, the Marquis of Gaviria, is 
well-known through Otazu’s work (1987). The Marquis mediated institutionally with 
the Queen Regent Maria Cristina for Weisweiller to take up an important stake in the 
loan transactions to the Government on the Cuba property, the banker also getting the 
subsequent contract rights to trade with the mercury of Almaden. 
Iñigo Ezpeleta and his brother-in-law Domingo Pérez Ansoategui were also 
correspondents of the House, and from 1832 they organized the delivery to the bankers 
of the whole Almaden output from Bayonne, Cadiz and Seville
32. The House of the 
merchant-banker Rodríguez Salcedo was also situated in Bayonne. Rodriguez became 
the main intermediary in the coin and precious metal export-import businesses with 
Spain
33. 
  Other less-known cases were those of small industry houses and merchants who 
played the role of Agency informants at the “hot” business spots of Malaga, where the 
Schultz family operated, and Almería, where the firm Spencer & Roda updated the 
Rothschild on the mining events that took place in the South-east of the Peninsula. This 
was also the role played by Hilarion Roux, the son of one of the Rothschild’s 
correspondents in Marseille. These correspondents immediately gave reports on the 
mining outputs and the state of the lead market, and they did not miss opportunities to  
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.upo.es/econ 
 
  13
offer specific business opportunities. This helped the family enormously in acquiring 
accurate information about the early lead industry during the 1840s and 1870s, before 
getting involved in it, in the context of the Peñarroya Company. 
 
IV 
 
Finally, the Rothschild network was rounded off in Spain with the establishment 
of clientele recruited from the Spanish political class. They were the channel through 
which the family tried to politically influence the government and the rest of the state 
institutions to their advantage.  
  The most common way to compensate, or to gain the favour of, these occasional 
co-operators, was to incorporate them into the boards of the companies under direct 
control of the family in Spain. It is the case of MZA, the railway company, where the 
phenomenon took striking dimensions. The board of this company boasted, from 1856 
to 1935, no less than thirteen Treasury Secretaries of State (Juan Alvarado, Manuel 
Bermúdez de Castro, José Manuel Collado, Venancio González, Alejandro Llorente, 
José Salamanca, José Canalejas, Amos Salvador, twice, and Juan Francisco Camacho, 
Pedro Salaverría and Gabino Bugallal, who were directors four times over); nine 
Secretaries of State for Public Works and the Economy (Albareda, Alejandro Pidal and 
the Count of Xiquena, twice); and three PMs (Alejandro Mon, Eduardo Dato, García 
Prieto and Bugallal). The stipend for these directors reached a minimum of ESP 10,000 
p/a, to be added to ESP 500 monthly for board attendance. Despite this fact, directors 
were not able to get 5% product surplus, as the Articles established, due to the fact that 
they never reached the minimum income levels
34. 
There were also directors coming from other companies, undoubtedly more 
interested in mutual economic interests than in the charging fees and stipends, as for 
instance the numerous group of directors of the bank of Spain, who were also essential 
in the Spanish Industrial and Merchant Company, the bank created to finance MZA. 
These virtually disappeared from MZA after the liquidation of this company in 1868, 
with the exception of some noteworthy cases, such as the Salaverría and Camacho ones, 
both Governors of the Bank of Spain, and that of Manuel María Álvarez, who was 
simultaneously director of both the Bank and MZA between 1889 and 1898, as well as 
that of García Prieto, who did the same between 1920 and 1920. At the Mortgage Bank  
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we find the cases of Albareda, Dato, García Prieto, Alvarado and Llorente, as well as a 
substantial amount of managers in the new commercial banks, like the Bank of Vizcaya, 
Hispano, Banesto, Banca Sáinz and the Urquijo bank, together with high profile 
businessmen such as the Basque Ramón de la Sota. All of them were integrated at 
MZA, in most cases, from the end of the First WW. 
At Peñarroya we find Gonzalo and Álvaro Figueroa, Marquis of Villamejor and 
Count of Romanones, respectively, the latter Secretary of State and PM of the Spanish 
Cabinet on several occasions. In 1912, they incorporated their sizeable mining-
industrial legacy to the assets of Peñarroya. From then on, and for the following four 
decades, both brothers, and later their progeny, took their places as members of the 
Board of the Company, getting into partnerships with Peñarroya so as to carry out 
investments in Spain and South America through the family company G. and A. 
Figueroa
35. 
This Board also included  José Canalejas Casas and his two sons, José and Luis 
Canalejas Méndez, all of them involved in politics, senators, but lacking the main role 
as a politician  that José Canalejas the son had. He was the great reformer of the Spanish 
politics at the beginning of the 20
th century. The three of them sat subsequently on the 
same chair at the Peñarroya Board, after previous experience in the railway Companyof 
Badajoz, taken over by MZA
36. Although the first to take it was not the father, though, 
but his son José, who joined Peñarroya in 1888 to replace the late Weil, as the 
counselling lawyer in Madrid and a salary of FF 1,500 p/a.
37  
The Rio Tinto Co., on the other hand, operated with a certain degree of 
independence in Spain, as opposed to the Rothschild’s typical system of insider dealing. 
Partly because the structure of its Board of Directors was very different from the model 
of the major railway companies, full of Spanish politicians, or the system of Peñarroya, 
that used to gradually integrate the managements of the several companies with which 
they merged. In part, also, because the Rothschild, as they took control of the company, 
twenty years after its foundation, found a series of very well ingrained, effective 
practices, hence deciding not to change and even reinforce their operational tactics. 
Harking back to the very moment in which the company was born, it is 
worthwhile noticing that the management of Rio Tinto also deemed the integration of 
relevant characters in the Spanish political scene as an interesting option. The aim was 
for these characters to intercede for the company to obtain a better treatment, although  
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in this case lesser figures were used. In 1847 they hired the MP Daniel Carballo, who 
speeded up the authorisations to carry out works at the railway and the port, and to 
accelerate machinery imports. From then on, he was in included, by virtue of his role in 
favour of the company until 1889, on the payroll, with an annual salary of GBP 1,200
38. 
Until 1896, he was followed by Enrique Bushell, but from that date onwards, the 
company considered that it was more profitable and discreet for the company to lean on 
the candidates of the conservative party in Huelva and Valverde del Camino, with the 
commitment from them to support the Rio Tinto Co. in Madrid.  
To reinforce this presence, the existence of an official representative in the 
Capitol city was institutionalised. He had the mission of managing the administrative 
issues of the company, directly with the Government. This job was assigned, from 1873 
to 1904, to Gabriel Rodríguez and his son Antonio; but it was from 1905, with José 
Valero Hervás, that the Río Tinto Company would reach its highest level of influence in 
Madrid.  
The way in which this company would get involved in the hidden corners of 
political corruption of the Restoration period is really striking. The company dominated 
and biased the encasillado
39 in the Huelva constituencies with total authority, which 
turned them into the most powerful cacique in the region. From then on, the company 
operated in order to gain favour with of the Government, justifying their presence as the 
only factor that could drive the dynastic parties to win in the mining area, in opposition 
to the republicans and the numerous socialist groups. Such a “service” was paid to the 
company by means of manifold political and economic privileges that rendered them 
virtually untouchable
40. 
 
V 
 
As far back as the Napoleon Wars, the Rothschild family ensured the way to 
take advantage of the fluctuating commodity and currency markets, with the prospect of 
increasing profits in the drawing of international bills.  Working in several venues and 
coordinating their multiple family businesses as one was an asset that soon allowed 
them to get to know the development of exchange rates, the movement of troops and the 
outcome of military battles beforehand, for their own benefits. This was the time when 
the Rothschild legend was born. Tales were told about their art to get information on  
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far-away markets cautiously and speedily, due to their skill in organising codified post 
through carrier pigeons and relay horses. Information, as a main element of commercial 
and financial activity, took a new economic sense in their hands, as it permitted them to 
move swiftly into Stock Exchanges and the markets of strategic commodities, in an 
increasingly dynamic and unforeseeable milieu
41. 
This is the philosophy that strongly marked the guidelines for the construction of 
the business network as described above. In this network, information played a main 
role, as the basis of the group’s overall activity.  
A living proof of the wish to get information as effectively as possible was 
Weisweiller and Bauer’s habit of writing duplicate letters both to Paris and London, 
respectively. This usage was to be repeated by the Madrid agents year after year, with 
no interruption.  
These letters, however, are to be grouped distinctly. On the one hand, business 
correspondence was to be reduced to inform about changes and accepted bills, and was 
sent that very day to the agency, from which they were forwarded straight away to the 
offices of the accountants in London and Paris. On the other hand, “private” 
correspondence contained the essential information to actually carry out specific 
businesses, to initiate determined deals or to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions. This information was obtained, as mentioned above, through its purchase, 
either from the house experts, or the client networks of the House. The tracking from 
the Agency of the legislative activity is really enlightening in the view of these letters, 
as it is surprising how they obtained confidential information about each and every one 
of the projects in hand. Their contact with the administration, the Court, and their 
periodical meetings with the MPs (of any ideology) was a steadily open door to any 
transaction. Whatever the business opportunity to perceived in Madrid, regarding either 
merchant (tobacco, copper, lead, mercury, flour..), financial (loans or allowances to the 
Government or to the Bank of  Spain, opening accounts for Royal members or Spanish 
financiers, precious metal sales, debt clearings, etc..) or industrial deals (mining or 
railway  contracts, for example), employers were swiftly informed on them accurately. 
This was not an obstacle for the Rothschild to lead their agents away from some of their 
Spanish affairs managed overseas or within the House itself, as was the case with Río 
Tinto.  
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At least one letter-report of this sort departed daily towards Paris or London, 
always by means of the quickest method: first by private post, then by railway lines, 
then the by telegraph and finally by phone. Internal communications worked to 
perfection, as we find evident in the negotiation of the loan for the Spanish State in 
1871. Alphonse and Gustave Rothschild had all the documents about such negotiations, 
and showed their surprise to know that the Spanish Finance Commission in Paris did 
not have any news on the subject
42. This was customary, as Weisweiller and Bauer 
always acknowledged that they had personnel in charge of forwarding legislative bills 
and the −ostensibly secret− terms supplied by other bankers to get the auctions or 
contracts, as happened to the Almaden products. These contacts were compensated 
generously, but their identity was never revealed, not even to the Rothschild  
 
VI 
 
As per usual, the Rothschild stipulated that their agents should act on their 
behalf, offering them ample powers of attorney and business. Nevertheless, the system 
worked at a level of loyalty and confidence where the decision and profit areas were 
perfectly demarcated: agents would carry out as many business operations as they 
wanted, informing the parent company in relation to the importance of the issue. The 
parent company always made the final decision, but when the agents acted on behalf of 
the Rothschild House, the profit would be kept by the family, without commissions.  In 
return, the Rothschild would deal with the agency charges, plus a fixed retribution.  
They usually compensated their agents with small stakes in the businesses they closed, 
preference rights in the House issues, and the partaking of some services to the 
companies controlled by the family. Hence, for instance, the London House reserved an 
eighth of the net profits in Almaden for the partners of the Madrid agency: 50% went to 
Bauer, 26.35% to Weisweiller and 23.65% to Ettling
43. They also reserved the financial 
services in Spain of  MZA,  Deutsch et Cíe.
44 and Peñarroya, which meant a substantial 
fixed income to them.
45 
There was a certain hierarchy and specialization when dealing with the different 
business areas. Weisweiller always proved to be the most capable of handling financial 
issues, designing the terms supplied for advances and the large loan or credit 
transactions to the State. He was also in charge of attending the AGMs at the Bank of  
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Spain in the 1860s, the years in which the House acquired a substantial amount of 
shares in the institution. 
Ignacio Bauer was specialised, however, in negotiations, political relationships 
and railway affairs. Not in vain was he a director at MZA for thirty years (1865-1895). 
This company was backed up by Cipriano Segundo Montesinos, a prestigious specialist 
amongst his peers, who became the first Industrial Engineer in Spain and was one of the 
drafters of the railway legislation in 1855, his time as Minister of Civil Engineering. In 
1899, after his retirement, MZA was controlled by a specific management committee 
exercising the executive power in the company, together with the Paris Committee. It 
would be integrated by the Bauer family and the new Managing Director Nathan Süss,  
replaced in 1908 by Eduardo Maristany, who would last until 1934, and a group of very 
reliable directors (never more than two) such as Eduardo Dato, Alvarado, Manuel 
Marqués, Bugallal o Antonio Valenciano
46. Other men at the House, namely Rafael 
Clemente and Martínez Campos, narrowly cooperated in these tasks. 
Outside these Boards, with regard to legal counselling matters, the company 
showed its preference to hire the most prestigious legal bureaus. The first to exercise the 
task with continuity was Manuel Cortina, who did not partake in the MZA Board but 
acted from the legacy as counsel. Cortina, who quit politics early enough, was Dean of 
the Madrid Law Association since 1847 and the most prestigious lawyer in Madrid until 
his death in 1879. He was replaced to perform that function by Venancio González, a 
man of the House, in those years, and by Eduardo Dato’s bureau in the 20
th century, 
possibly together with that of Gabino Bullagal, both being first-rate politicians and 
lawyers.  Vicente Piniés, the former Justice Secretary of State would also cooperate in 
the thorny affair of the Bauer’s bankruptcy in 1931.  
Finally, Ettling, and then Weil, were mainly in charge of the commercial and 
mining affairs of the House, substituting the formerly mentioned men when they had to 
travel abroad. For day-to-day work, the Agency
47 would also maintain a number of 
employees on its payroll. We do not know exactly their names nor the dates of their 
incorporation to the company, but we know that, after the departure of Estanislao 
Urquijo, Moreno and Barcaiztegui, who had worked with Weisweiller in the first years, 
José de Endara y Goñi was employed by the Agency, receiving powers of attorney in 
the hands of Bauer in 1872, together with Weil. The Agency cashier, Pedro Rodríguez 
González, in addition to Vicente Esquivel and Federico Perugia, would exercize a  
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similar competence in 1885, but only Pedro Rodríguez González would maintain it in 
1888, this time with Gustavo Bauer, who started to cooperate with his father very early; 
both of them would take it up again in 1890
48. The sons of Pedro Rodríguez, José and 
Jesús Rodríguez Ferro would go on in the 1920s in the role of their father until the 
bankruptcy of the Agency in 1931. Together with them, we find other experts who did 
not belong to the House properly, such as the lawyer and politician Venancio González, 
the civil engineer Rafael Clemente and  Miguel Martínez Campos, who are mentioned 
in the House documents as “employees”, but whose denomination seems to be restricted 
to the internal usage within the MZA
49.  
In the headquarters, on the other hand, the Rothschild had first-rate employees, 
who integrated the Boards of the companies controlled by the family, or managed them 
from their own offices.  
In Paris, for instance, at the Paris Committee of the MZA railway company, 
where the strategic policies of the company were really designed during its first years, 
renowned figures like the economist Leon Say are found
50.  Grandson of Jean Baptiste 
Say, this liberal politician, very close to Gustave Bauer, was the Finance Secretary of 
State in France on several occasions, and also the director of the du Nord Company. He 
became possibly the most important expert on the committee in the years following the 
first line establishment. With Say’s influence, the former finance inspector Rene Lisle 
got into the management of MZA and du Nord. After going through the lower echelons 
of the company, Lisle took up his former role as his mentor at the Committee, in close 
contact with Maristany. Lisle got incorporated in Peñarroya in 1923, with the very same 
role of supervisor of the Rothschild’s interests. He, together with Gustavo and Alfredo 
Bauer, Robert Rothschild, Ferdinand Duval and Pierre Getten, who replaced him in 
such roles during the 1930s, were the only ones to share their chair simultaneously at 
both Peñarroya and MZA.   
  Also employed at the House were  the engineer Leon Aucoc, who operated side 
by side with Say, the prestigious economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, who entered the 
Board of Peñarroya in 1893 and Gastón Griolet,  President of the Paris Committee since 
the death of Gustave Rothschild. Other characters were also close to the Rothschild, 
such as the Baron Lambert or René Mayer, who would reach the presidency of the 
French executive in the 1850s, as well as the previously mentioned representatives of  
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the House at Peñarroya: Cornelis and Pierre de Witt, Ferdinand Duval and Armand de 
Lau. 
Regarding mining affairs, the Paris House hired the services of a veritable 
expert, Jules Aron, a capable mining engineer with the mission of advising his new 
bosses on the most profitable investments, also supervising and coordinating the 
industrial policy of the companies where he would eventually work. As we indicated 
above, Aron was appointed deputy engineer at the Peñarroya management team, and 
remained in that post until 1917. He was replaced by René Weil, who performed such a 
role during the 1920s and 1930s. Hamilton Smith, who would become manager at the 
Exploration Co., took over in London with the same functions
51. 
 
VII 
 
Once information had been properly channeled, having gone through the filters 
of the Agency and the experts at the headquarters, the network organization as a whole 
had no other purpose but reducing negotiation costs to a minimum, increasing profits in 
each and every transaction. 
Within the scope of the business with public finance, it became apparent that the 
House was more than able to face most of the transactions and businesses they took up 
on their own. Therefore, it is very clear that the family and their representatives were 
interested in incorporating certain people to their transactions, just in the sole search of 
a specific profit.  
Such was the case of Weisweiller’s agreements with Queen Regent Cristina’s 
administrator, Antonio Gaviria. These agreements were reached with the purpose of 
ensuring the swift payment of their loans to the Government, without the customary 
delays
52. As proof of the real possibilities of Gaviria’s and Queen Cristina’s influence 
on the management of the Treasury payments is the experience of the Bank of San 
Fernando. This Bank complained to the Regent because the Treasury was prioritizing 
the payment of bills and drafts to Gaviria and Weisweiller to the detriment of their own, 
which were older
53. In spite of this fact, the Rothschild tried to ensure other additional 
supports to their transactions. Hence, they applied for, and achieved, a “moral warranty” 
from the British Government to “upkeep the Rothschild’s interests”, which Palmerston 
himself sent to the Havana Consul
54. The role of   Scharfenberg as intermediary is not to  
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be forgotten. He operated so effectively that the Bank of San Fernando required his 
services to unblock their accounts in 1840
55. 
 
In those cases in which personal relationships and favours were not enough, insider 
dealing and bribery were used as usual tools of performance, both to close and/or 
accelerate specific transactions, and to compensate good turns or ensure personal 
loyalties. 
The most renowned of all the briberies took place in 1834, with the Almaden 
contract, when Lionel Rothschild overcame any resistance from the Minister Toreno 
with a very well documented bribery of FF1.3m (4,962,100 reales)  and the donation to 
the Queen´s civil list of 2 to 6 million reales.
56 This practice was repeated extensively 
throughout the following years with the due discretion. Such that although Weisweiller 
solved the delays of different transactions by bribing Mon (Otazu, 1987: 275), we know 
similar payments were being made in the credit offered in 1868-69 and 1871, as well as 
in the operations for the Almaden contract in 1870. Many Treasury officials benefited 
from these “gifts” (or rather, bribes), as did the ministers themselves, although 
Weisweiller and Bauer took great care in keeping their names in the dark, even as far as 
the Rothschild were concerned. In the specific case of the Almaden transaction, the 
intermediary concerned received no less than  GBP 61,524, namely ESP 1,497,494
57, 
which meant a fourth part of the total profits from the transaction. Otherwise, the 
Agency customarily reserved 2% of the net profits from the precious metal business for 
small bribes to informants and friends in court, as was emphasised above.  
  In the scope of the business practices carried out by their companies it is evident 
that the politicians with seats on the various boards, were named specially for the 
purpose of insider trading, to a larger or greater degree.   
In the MZA case, both PMs and MPs alternated their governmental duties with 
their presence on the boards of the companies that they had to legislate upon. In some 
cases, the person in question did not even show any embarrassment whatsoever about 
keeping both a post on the MZA board, and within the Cabinet simultaneously
58.  
  The range of cases to be applied as examples of the favourable treatment given 
to the company by the Parliament is endless, especially during the period during which 
the network was built, when the legislation on the financing of railway companies 
(mainly in the issue of bonds) was amended several times to their benefit. In other  
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cases, the Government supported large companies by taking decisions, contrary to the 
public interest. This was the case of Norte and MZA, and their competition for the lines 
of access to Catalonia. But it was the PM himself, Cánovas, who sponsored, in 1896, an 
agreement between both, for the establishment of a series of combined tariffs and the 
proportional release of profits
59. Since 1906, a new accord institutionalised a Norte- 
MZA mixed commission, in charge of solving the general policy on combined 
transports, as well as reaching agreements for the transport of specific wares
60. In that 
way, MZA consolidated their overall traffic monopoly between Madrid and the coast of 
Levant, Andalusia, the Manche, Badajoz and Saragossa, towards the north, where Norte 
shared the area with them.  
  One of the most striking cases of this type of behaviour was at of the politician 
Eduardo Dato, who apart from being the lawyer of the Rothschilds in Spain and a close 
friend of the Bauer, took part in the MZA Management Commission for several years. 
He became famous also, when it became necessary, for defending the interests of the 
Río Tinto Company. Nevertheless, the MPs on the Company’s payroll were actually in 
charge of this, and they did it efficiently at least for as long as the Restoration politics 
operated. From the time of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship onwards, the British mining 
giant started to bear the difficulties of the stagnation of the cacique system. The most 
important problem to arise, undoubtedly, was the large-scale file on tax evasion, started 
in 1928. After finding the necessary proof, the government obliged Río Tinto to pay a 
fine of many million of pesetas for failing to declare their exports correctly, which made 
the accounts of the company stumble for several years
61.  
  In the case of Peñarroya, there still remains pending a more thorough research to 
find out the limits of the political bearing of their Spanish directors. And even more so 
with the Count of Romanones who became minister and PM several times and sat at the 
chair of Peñarroya for longer than 40 years, since his incorporation into the company in 
exchange for a huge package of shares in the company and the exclusive rights to 
exploit lead in Spain. We are very much aware, though, of the destitution of the 
Minister of the Treasury Urzáiz in 1917, who was discharged in hours by Romanones 
for having signed two Royal ordinances levying the export of copper and pyrites
62, 
against Río Tinto’s interests. 
We have also found traces of Canalejas’s influence in favour of this company. 
For example, in July 1891 members of the Canalejas family, defended in the Senate the  
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proposal by Peñarroya for the railway line from Peñarroya to Fuente del Arco
63. José 
Canalejas the junior did his job well and managed to withdraw most of the requirements 
imposed, such as the duty to have different wagons for prisoners and post, and the need 
to regulate traffic under the post administration
64. The second son, Luis, a civil 
engineer, was compensated with ESP 5,000, for his good services, provided for the 
construction of this railway
65. All of the above are examples of the manipulation by the 
Spanish politicians who were present in the companies mentioned, as well as of the 
levels of corruption in the system.  
 
VIII 
 
The complex organizational business network of the Rothschild House in Spain, 
and the scope of these businesses, raises several very important issues from the point of 
view of business initiative and the search for profit: 
-  If we consider the key issue of business performance at the Rothschild House, the 
Spanish experience indicates that information on business opportunities was their 
main competitive advantage over other investors. Despite being considered as 
financiers, industrial entrepreneurs or miners, the nub of the Rothschild business 
actually consisted of handling information, although this may not be their only 
strength, as will be demonstrated below. They built up a sophisticated, well-
structured and peculiar network for the management of information, with a strategic 
scope aimed at seizing relevant information wherever it was generated. Due to the 
nature of the information and its value of exclusivity, they designed a network 
endowed with high levels of safety by virtue of the loyalty to the House showed on 
the part of all the different nuclei of people who worked for the Rothschild. 
-  The network system, divide into holding companies, agencies, correspondents, 
partners and clients allowed for the acquisition of business opportunities in different 
environments, transmitting it to the management centres smoothly, depending on the 
importance of the business in question. The network structure allowed for the 
conveyance of information up the hierarchy, taking into account different and wide 
business areas in its descent. It also permitted a special relationship with key people 
in the decision-making process, especially in the economic sphere.   
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-  The safety and loyalty of the network was guaranteed at the lowest level, by means 
of economic incentives. But when we refer to key people in the management of the 
agencies, information was channelled and selected by people with a special training 
received in the different European facilities of the Rothschild House. These people, 
of Jewish ethnic origin, kept family relationships in a criss-crossing fashion, which 
endowed them with strong links of loyalty to the House. This factor guaranteed that 
the strategic factor, information, would not be shared by competitors or taken 
advantage of for specific interests. By strengthening the participation of the 
employees in a profit-sharing scheme, was another way to ensure such loyalty. 
-    On numerous occasions, and by virtue of the management of information, the 
ostensible policy of the Rothschild’s, in their way of handling their businesses, was 
to reach a situation of market power, either through monopoly, or through privileged 
treatment in regulated markets, or through the availability of strategic information. 
The latter would enable them to reach maximum levels of profits and income, 
achieve cost reduction as well as risk reduction, acquired by facing uncertainty in 
the privileged position of those who managed exclusive information sooner than 
their competitors. This policy, peculiar to income-searchers rather than 
entrepreneurs, was not restricted to the handling of privileged information, but also 
went beyond, using agents at the lowest levels so as to alter the business 
environment to their own benefit. The payroll, full of political personalities with 
important positions in the different Spanish Governments, is a testimony to this 
reality. 
-  The nature of the Spanish economic and political system promoted the success of 
such businesses and increased the chances for it, as the network was completely 
reliable due to the imperviousness of information channels and the discrete character 
of bribes and retribution. Regarding the latter aspect, the endogamy of the network 
structure generated sufficient confidence and prevented problems arising between 
agencies as regards incentives, since the interests of agents and employers 
coincided. In addition, the complexity of the network also served as a suitable 
barrier for agents having access to information, as none of them had a global vision 
of the business. 
-  In the Spanish economic environment of those years, the Rothschild House 
performed their business functions efficiently, mainly regarding Knight’s avoidance  
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of uncertainty. They might have gone beyond this aspect too, as they were able to 
alter the future economic environment, as long as they could boast about having 
people working for them who could alter that environment at the governmental 
level, in one way or another. However, it has to be acknowledged that the system 
designed to take up business opportunities, as Kirzner establishes, was plainly 
admirable and provided them with a steady situation of market empowerment. 
Nevertheless, the way in which they performed those functions may be brought into 
question, as it lacked ethical values and even bordered on income searching and 
even illegality, despite the fact that behind those activities there lied a productive 
action, not a merely speculative one.   
-  If we assessed the activities of the Rothschild House in Spain from the business 
perspective in the era under analysis, we could firmly maintain that their action was 
mainly focused on the performance of business functions as described by Knight 
(uncertainty avoidance) and Kirzner (taking up profit opportunities). With respect to 
the rest of the business theories, we cannot establish, for example, that the action 
defined by Leibenstein as regards the reduction of the ever-existing inefficiencies in 
business was one of the strategies pursued by the company. However, the 
innovating business function as described by Schumpeter has its reference in the 
activity performed by the House in Spain.  As they were aware of the role that 
technology was starting to play in the economic activity, they did not hesitate in 
hiring the best engineers for the management of their mining exploitation, probably 
being clear instances, in certain markets, of the way in which innovation leads to 
monopoly.  
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